The Constitutional, Legislative and Executive Struggle in Present-Day Ecuador: Does It Allow Progress or Hinder It

Abstract

The aim of this scientific article is: To describe how, in the last two years, the intensification of a strong conflict between the constitutional and legislative function and the executive function in Ecuador has been determinant in the political economic, and security instability the country suffers. The research has a qualitative approach, and the methodology it uses is analytical-synthetic, exegetical, and inductive, which is supported by the review of norms, jurisprudence, and specialized bibliography, considering mechanisms such as: Political trial, presidential veto, and the so-called mutual death, as well as the role of the Constitutional Court in the control of constitutionality. It is concluded that the result of the Ecuadorian constitutional model formally expanded the separation of powers; its effectiveness depends on inter-institutional cooperation, political culture, and effective respect for constitutional limits, indispensable elements to guarantee political stability legal security and democratic governance for the benefit of the common good.